The German Romantic movement is inextricably intertwined with the philosophy, or at least with the results of philosophy after Kant. And frequent idealists with poets and philosophers of the Romantic writers, and the development that the movement was also in magazines and in academia. This essay on the topic of the User Manual Class is clearly aimed at students who are studying philosophy in high schools, both scientific teaching, but for the simplicity of the exposure, even students from other courses may find it appropriate to complete the educational attainment on 'argument. (SC-CM)
IDEALISM AND ROMANTICISM IN A fragment of Hölderlin
Being one with all , this is the life of the gods is heaven man! Being one with all living things, come back, in a blessed oblivion of the divine self, in all of nature, this is the culmination of thoughts and joys, this is the sacred peak of the mountain, the place of eternal rest, where the loses its heat of midday and the thunder of his voice and the raging seas of all'ondeggiare resembles a field of corn. (Hölderlin)
BY the Ideal Kantian criticism
the end of the eighteenth century, Kant's contemporaries were fully aware of the enormous importance of critical thinking, so much so that pull over to the radical change introduced, the Copernican revolution made by the German thinker in the field of epistemology, the French Revolution. However, Kant was convinced that the criticism had not reached its full development, as they continued to live irreconcilable dualisms (sensitivity / understanding, knower / actor, noumenon / phenomenon), etc.. Starting from these considerations, some thinkers of Germany riding a century, generally indicated by the name of post-Kantian, gave birth to a lively discussion on the value of criticism and need for a revision of Kantianism. In fact, with the turn of the century change what Hegel will define the spirit of the world's romantic prospects begin to appear, with the inevitable result that many of the arguments set out by Kant and perfectly acceptable in view of the Enlightenment, have now become unrealistic.
One of the first responders, when Kant was still alive, in the debate on criticism was KARL LEONHARD REINHOLD (1758-1823), with the performance of a new theory of human faculty of representation (1786-1788). Reinhold had no claim to present itself as original thinker: for yourself from the Kantian, he feels a duty to disclose and does so by including inadvertently some new elements that will pave the way to idealism. Reinhold notes that the subject and object are not thinkable separately: I could never think of the subject without taking into account the purpose, and, conversely, I could never think of the object regardless of the subject. It follows inevitably that subject and object are conceived and designed by Reinhold as two sides of same coin, as if they were referring to a single principle: consciousness, understood as the right of representation. The subject is the form of knowledge, that is the activity through which the manifold is a unified concept, while the object is its subject, that is representative of the content that is unified. This indissoluble relationship, within the representation of the subjective-objective-formal and material that justifies the close connection between the various cognitive faculties: sensibility in the object prevails on the subject, there is balance in the intellect and reason there is a predominance of the free activity of the subject. According to Kant, we build the phenomenal object, but upstream of it there is still a thing in itself (noumenon), independent of the subject and his activities which they are made precisely this distinction Kant distanced berkeleiano idealism. Now, Reinhold, conceiving the subject and the object as faces of a single action (representation), it deprives the Kantian distinction between subject and object. Although Reinhold consider fully Kantian idealism, and he opens the door to his basic thesis: according to the idealist view, is a company that builds the object from scratch. To think of it, a sort of loss of the thing itself was already in Kant: the more time passed and the more he became convinced that the thing itself was a purely negative (noumenon is phenomenon that is not), with attenuation of the autonomy of the object. And idealism is precisely the shift in the phasing out of the Kantian thing in itself, not by chance, idealism German late eighteenth century can be defined as a progressive attempt to identify the object with the subject, with a gradient typically monistic: the ultimate goal, in fact, is to find a principle that can explain everything. Must therefore exceed the slew of unresolved dualisms inherited from Kant (first of all the subject / object) by reducing them, like everything else, to a single principle. These issues are already being felt part of Reinhold, which solves the problem of the thing itself with this reasoning: the formal aspect of knowledge, attributable solely to the subject, is part of the representation, on the contrary, the matter comes from cognitive something intended in itself as something absolutely indefinite and unknowable, as such, it is not even represented, that falls outside of representation itself. It was not representative, it is not anything real, as if he were, would fall within an object and representation. The thing itself is therefore only a concept, to the extent necessary to the justification of the material element of knowledge, by its very unthinkability goes beyond representation and, therefore, of reality.
Author of great importance for the transition from idealism Kantianism is also Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761-1833), whose pseudonym was Enesidemo. In 1792 appeared anonymously wrote his Enesidemo, or on the foundations of philosophy in Jena elements supported by Mr. prof. Reinhold, along with a defense of skepticism against the claims of critics of reason. In the critical philosophy, which he intended as a merger of the thought of Kant and Reinhold, Schulze rinviene a series of contradictions that come with the statement at the height of the thing itself. He defends the position of skepticism and Reinhold sees a defender of orthodox criticism, without taking account of changes made. In the text just cited, Schulze explicitly criticizes the thing in itself, highlighting the contradictions resulting from the criticism. Kant showed rationally as the category of causality is applicable only in the empirical legitimately, but then he has used meta-empirical applying it to the thing itself, saying that knowledge is nothing if not the result of drawing up the material of experience, to turn was the result of the thing itself, is it not true that Kant made use of the thing itself as a cause? The thing itself is understood as something that in fact the case, so dark, the emergence of the experience. If the thing in itself change our sense organs receive the material because it has the experience, it means that the thing itself acts causally on us. Schulze learned from the paradox is that the thing itself is unknowable, but Kant builds around it the whole cognitive process. Another paradox: Kant says you can only know if you unify the data of experience with the intellect, so that where there is experience there is no knowledge, but he admits the ability to know the categories, forms a priori intellect, thus acknowledging that one can have knowledge without the contribution of sensitivity. The entire Critique of Pure Reason is just that, an attempt to ascertain the forms of knowledge, as Kant said, paradoxically, that forms no sensitive data are unknowable. This leads Schulze to reject the existence of the thing in itself because, admitting, would inevitably result in conflict. Here we go with Schulze fully idealism: all the authors of this period (Schulze included) claim to be, so to speak, more Kantian than Kant himself was almost as if the thinker of Konigsberg had been inspired by right frame of mind (idealism), but had not had the courage to go further: the idealistic thrust, in fact, is present in Kant, particularly when he says that knowledge revolves around the subject, but admitted the existence of a thing in itself, he is guilty of cowardice, not having had the courage to recognize that everything depends on the subject.
initiated by Schulze Furthermore, it covers all the way, Joshua Salomon well, a Lithuanian jew scholar Moses Maimonides, from which assumed the name of Salomon Maimon (1754-1800). His thinking is more mature in the words written critical research on the human spirit (1797). If the contradictions of the criticism brought Schulze in favor of mold Humean skepticism, Maimon is of the opinion that we can return in full force to the criticism, provided a complete elimination of the thing itself, which is nothing but an absurd waste of dogmatism, almost as if Hume had not been able to wake up at all by dogmatic slumber in which Kant had collapsed. If everything that can be represented is contained in the consciousness, as claimed Reinhold, then the thing itself, falling out of consciousness and being unrepresentable, is a non-thing (in German Unding) and a monstrosity unacceptable. It is approached from Maimon to imaginary numbers, the square root of a negative number, which are in their very essence impossible. But the total elimination of the thing itself is to recognize that all knowledge, with regard to its principles and its content, falls within the sphere of consciousness. The figure does not come from outside, but it is what, within consciousness, we still have an incomplete and imperfect knowledge: more precisely, it is permanent element of knowledge, what has not yet been determined by a priori forms of 'self. Outside of consciousness there is nothing in the case of purely intelligible knowledge (math), subjects can determine all of its object, in the case of sensitive knowledge, however, does not allow an indefinite approach to the complete determination, without being able to ever get. If I think of a triangle, my mind totally fits the object in question, but when I have a cognitive approach to the subject is sensitive in front of me (for example, the book), some of it will be framed by my cognitive faculties , while some will remain and will be excluded the notorious thing in itself. This residue of indeterminacy is what causes the object as given, and not as a product of the subject. In so doing, Maimon releases the criticism from its anchor and the empirical results starts to idealistic. Maimon leads to extreme consequences the fact that the thing itself is a purely negative concept, coming to think of it as strictly related: the thing itself is nothing if not a residue not perfectly framed by the cognitive forms of man is what remains dall'inquadramento out categorically. The learning process goes on forever, and for this reason, you may not frame in all its forms: what remains is just non-classified the thing itself.
The deletion of the thing itself from criticism of the framework is also confirmed by Jacob Sigismund Beck (1761-1840), author of a paper entitled "The single point of view from which the Kantian philosophy can be judged ( 1796). Beck seeks to interpret the Kantian thought in order to grasp the essential truth and remain faithful to it, but, nevertheless, he ends up taking a further step towards the ideal: a good reason, therefore, he is repudiated by Kant. Beck, similar to Fichte distinguishes two moments in the development of the cognitive process: the original production and recognition. If the thing in itself does not exist, it necessarily follows that the process by which the subject creates the object is no longer a construction (intellectual organization of sensitive data), but production does not work on material that is given to me (as Kant thought), but I built it myself, I'm all 'origin of the material that I'll have to know. It follows that the object is a production of the subject, which produces both the shape and material of knowledge. The world around me is my production is not true that there is a world and we see it differently from how it is (as Kant thought), on the contrary, the world we produce (original production). It seems paradoxical, since, if I produce the world as a subject, how come when I was born I am convinced that it exists independently of me, or as an object in itself? Why do we have the impression they were facing a world independent from us? Beck explains the second step of development in the cognitive process and the recognition: the subject produces the object (the original production), but does so in an unconscious way, after which it reproduces, or recognizes it (recognition). The illusion that there is a thing in itself, a world independent from us comes from the fact that the original production is unconscious, we produce the world without realizing it. Fichte also explain the meaning of this, Beck simply propose it. He is also implicit in the idea that there is some sort of process triadic to which the subject places the object, and then recognizes him, almost as if they recover, in a kind of triadic process: first the subject is one that is in itself, then there's the person who puts the object and, finally, there is the person who retrieves the object detected. This, however, is very close to the Christian Trinity: the Father is, then the Father who begets the child, and then the love between the two (Holy Spirit). To explain this idea, this embryonic Beck will Hegel. On these bases so far exhibited born the famous triad of idealists, consisting of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. They happen in a very tight so that the downward trend of the first two is very fast, because every time the newcomer obscure the fame of his predecessor. And thus the climax of reflection fichteana ranks over the last few years of the eighteenth century, when it will be outclassed from the just twenty-five Schelling, whose dominance will extend until 1807 and beyond: at this point will come into play Hegel. After the fateful date of 1800, as soon as its star is declined, the outcome of the thought of Fichte takes a theological-religious coloring is interesting, because the period that follows the Kantian philosophy is characterized by a controversial anti-intellectual, a polemic against the intellect, or against the cognitive power of finite; Romantic age, which is especially felt in the search of the infinite intellect, which was the option preferred by Kant and the Enlightenment, reason takes over, or the ability to grasp the infinite, the absolute. In this scenario there will be two different attitudes: there will be those who reject both the intellect and reason, thus approaching the mystical-intuitive positions, then there will be those who, like Hegel, recognize the inferiority of intellect and reason than the therefore, will focus entirely on it. The risk of the critical intellect is, so to speak, to get too involved and end up carried away with such criticism also the reason, denying it each cognitive legitimacy. However, it remains true that all anti-intellectual culture will be romantic, but not all will be anti-rational (Hegel in particular). Of course, as long as the intellect and contrast the reason I stick to it, is still in the realm of philosophy, of rational inquiry, but if, in addition to criticizing the intellect, also critical of the reason, here I do not move more in 'field of philosophy, which is rooted in rationality. Returning to the three ideals, the only remaining consistently faithful to reason, to the end, Hegel is (its hierarchy is a philosophy, religion, 2, 3 art), Fichte and Schelling, however, are both philosophy and then cross over into areas beyond the right: the privileging of religion will recognize Fichte, Schelling art. In these two thinkers is as if, paradoxically, the reason for his suicide decreed itself by appealing to religion (Fichte) and art (Schelling).
The Romantic
the late eighteenth-century Germany is experiencing a remarkable cultural flowering and German philosophy becomes the real center of world philosophy, so much so that it is often spoken German classical age. On the philosophical level the period is marked by three different events: 1) criticism (that lives and dies with Kant) 2) idealism (which we have spoken), which moves from the systematic reorganization of the work to arrive at the negation of the Kantian thing in itself 3) the romance, which eludes any precise chronological determination and content. Precise dates are lacking on the development of this movement, but to make matters worse, there is also no objective criteria to decide the romance of the authors. If the idea of \u200b\u200bthe Enlightenment ruled out of the previous dark period due to the light of reason, Romanticism in the issue is more complex. You can groped to establish a comparison, understanding the relationship between Romanticism and idealism. Idealism is a fully-fledged philosophy of the Romantic era, but idealism is not all romantic philosophy: that is, idealism was born and lives in a romantic age, but it is not necessarily the romantic philosophy. Hegel himself, the greatest idealist, moving heavy criticism of Romanticism, although in many respects himself romantic. Perhaps the item that best characterizes romanticism is the lively polemic anti-intellectual, fought against the intellectualism of the Enlightenment. The whole philosophy of Kant, the maximum expression of the age of enlightenment, claimed the absolute privilege of the intellect (faculty the finished product) at the expense of reason (right of infinity), convinced that human knowledge, to be legitimate, he could never take infinite character. The Romantic distort the teaching Kant, convinced that tap into the infinite action is legitimate: it inevitably follows that, as it can use both intellect and reason, we prefer to reason, able to put man in touch with the infinite. However, though most of the Romantics (Hegel in particular) will line up in favor of reason understood as the infinite power and against the intellect may be understood as the finite, another great piece of intellectual leave too much of the time taken by the heat against the intellect and will end up arguing against the rational faculties in general (including the reason): Now, it is clear that if we move away from the intellect but we remain faithful to reason while you can always develop a philosophical system, Hegel and not coincidentally, arch enemy of intellect, will give rise to the largest processing philosophical rationale ever. If, however, next to intellect, it also rejects the reason, you leave the ball leads to philosophical and mystical areas. If idealism, on the whole, tended to overwhelm the intellect in its argument but recognized the validity of reason, the Romantics, for the most part, railed against both the intellect is against reason, order, paradoxically, the impossibility of romantic philosophy is why the greatest philosopher of the Romantic era, Hegel, is the enemy of Romanticism. Triad of idealistic, romantic are the two most closely just Fichte and Schelling, whose thought comes to completely break away from the rational faculties, while the less romantic (Hegel) is what is most rational. Perhaps the most common element is the romantic thinkers turned polemic against rationalism. To reason, declared incapable of grasping the essential core of reality and human nature, are opposed to the feeling, instinct and passion. It is often said that the opposition between Enlightenment and Romanticism lies in the rediscovery of romantic passion and feeling in contrast to the cold and strict Enlightenment reason: in reality, with the Romantics are deepened and taken to an extreme passion and emotion, which however, had already been discovered and evaluated positively by Enlightenment Rousseau (The New Heloise). A difference perhaps less obvious but certainly more accurate is the tendency to claim the romantic spirituality at the expense of Enlightenment materialism. Kant had already tentatively open slits inward and the subjectivity of implementing the Copernican revolution of thought, and now, the Romantics discussed the issue and bring to completion the increasing attention to the subjectivity brought by Petrarch. Just under that subjectivity must understand the inner life, the heart of the passions, and the exaltation of that component of human nature leads to a significant appreciation of individuality. The Enlightenment tends to prevail (even in politics) that was equal, universal and valid everywhere, in the belief that there were good things and bad, right or wrong, ever, regardless of the specific conditions: according to the Enlightenment it was to choose always and everywhere the right to follow the dictates of reason, regardless of reality or the historical period in which it was. Romanticism, however, enhances the size of individuality, making a distinction, however: there will be a single individuality, and it will be born from the idea, typically romantic genius, is the idea that there are no privileged individuals and superior to others (which are often not included) as capable of grasping the very essence of reality. Not by chance there is the desire for originality and becomes more and more frequently accused of plagiarism, hitherto almost unknown, in a climate in which you want to respond to the incipient bourgeois dall'appiattimento massification started the French Revolution. It should be remembered that, after 1815, we are in the Restoration and strong disappointment over the failure of Napoleon's project, so that some more sensitive spirits feel the desire to rebel against the stifling atmosphere of the Restoration and they do it with works of art outside the ordinary, worthy of a genius. Then there is also the exaltation of individuality collective reaction to the universalism advocated by the Enlightenment, are appreciating the collective units, the distinctions between peoples and cultures. The idea that what is right may not be in Paris in Naples, says Vince Cook, to emphasize that it is absurd the abstract universality of the Enlightenment. It is true that what the reason is fair to us as just anywhere and everywhere, regardless of the actual material conditions: what is fair in Paris in Naples can be as long as it falls in the reality of the situation, taking into account the actual differences that exist between the two cities. Subjectivity is also connected to the concept of infinity, one of the Romantics: failing the Kantian thing in itself, the subject can legitimately aspire to tap into the infinite by reason, which rises so dominating intellect. But just because you prefer the romantic age of reason, or the possibility of infinity? As long as I believe in the footsteps of Kant, that there are two principles of reality (subject and object) and two of knowledge (form and content) radically separated, this admission will mean that my knowledge is over (privileging the intellect) because there will be still something out of me and I can never completely used up in my head: If you know it means, so to speak, to introduce the subject in himself, framing, for Kant, we can only know what we have spent with the laws of our thinking in the world, with the inevitable consequence of what I did not put me in the world can not have certain knowledge. It follows that can only be a finite knowledge and intellect will be the most appropriate choice. If, however, admit that everything is derived from the subject, as does the idealism that is, if I admit that the subject does not build (that does not organize the material that forms it receives from the outside), then the world I see is a product of the subject and, precisely because it is myself to make it, I will know fully, totally, absolutely, without limitation, with the result that the reason (not the intellect) becomes the most suitable epistemological tool. Man can and must strive to infinity, and yet there will be thinkers consider it impossible to reach infinity, with the result that their philosophy is tinged with pessimism. There will be a pessimistic Romanticism, born not made by the aspiration to infinity, and Romanticism as optimistic convinced that man can reach infinity. The last letters of Jacopo Ortis are a shining example of pessimistic Romanticism, in which the protagonist comes to suicide after being capacitated inability to grasp the Infinite. The cosmic pessimism of Leopardi is based on a similar basis: the man aspires to the infinite, and yet can never go beyond the finite, then his life is tormented from pain and suffering for not being able to push if he would like. Hegel represents the most blatant case of Romanticism optimistic: he believes that man can, using the reason reach infinity, and is one of the most optimistic philosophers of history, so much as to say that "every negative is also positive ". Even thinkers such as Fichte and Schelling are highly optimistic, although they may be accessed only with the infinite extra-rational means (religion and art). Here, then, that some thinkers in the faith prevails as the ratio immediate (unmediated by reason) with the Absolute, Schelling, for one, will find a direct and immediate relationship with the Absolute in the art, through the creative genius. Two other concepts which are often typically romantic, it was desired to build opposition to the Enlightenment is the history and nature.
age of enlightenment had prevailed in the mechanistic and materialistic view of the world as a great machine composed of individual gears, so to prevail over all these were in fact (the atoms in physics, politics and individuals); this model is outdated and the Romantics, who prefer it to the 'organicism, namely the notion that count are not the individual parts (as it was for the Illuminati), but the whole taken as a whole. It was, Once again, Kant to open ways towards this end, when, in the Critique of Judgement, he admitted that a living being, however simple it may be, can never be explained in depth mechanistic laws. If the mechanism, then, tended to conceive how the machine was not even what car (living things), organicism goes in the opposite direction, tending to even conceive of as a body that body is not. Nature is not, therefore, a large machine that moves according to Newton's laws, but is characterized as a huge creature, itself a reflection of some kind of spirituality. And so, in the literary field, is enhanced correspondence the inner state of man and nature, closely related to each other. At this interpretation has led to idealism: when the nature of the subject product is declared philosophically, I flipped, then it is clear that it too is spiritual, just catch him know (and therein lies the difficulty) to grasp the able truth of the poet and the artist more than the scientist. Nature takes on a spiritual and vitalistic coloring: In this scene, back in vogue thinkers like Giordano Bruno (rediscovered by Schelling) and Spinoza, united by a pantheistic conception of nature. Compared with age-rationalist and Enlightenment is a radical reversal: science itself assumes a new guise. If Descartes, mechanistic in its fury, had come to interpret the human heart as an internal combustion engine, in the Romantic and divine nature comes alive, as they had intended Bruno and Spinoza. The scientists of this era (including Volta), therefore, does not take an interest in mechanics (as they did the scientists of the seventeenth and eighteenth century) as magnetism and electricity, fields not easily reducible to mechanics, abhorred in As an emblem of mechanism. The magnetism and electricity, then, are united by the fact that both suggest a kind of vitality that the nature sought by the Romantics: from Thales onwards, moreover, the magnet, with its ability to attract iron, was often conceived as a living and animated. There is a tendency to persistently seek a polarity in nature that corresponds to that identified by Fichte between ego and non-I, under the pretense of finding a match between plurality and diversity of spiritual nature. The interests of the Romantics also focus on the story, especially dear also to the Enlightenment, however, as in the conception of nature, even in that history there are differences. The Enlightenment looked to history as the history of human errors of the past, in the belief that there were rational and natural ways to live and that in the past they had been undermined by superstition and beliefs: the story would appear to constitute the progressive liberation of man from superstition and the belief that prevailed in the past, the same evil, in the future good and that this was nothing if not a step towards the good. Also saw the Enlightenment as an actor in the history of humanity, however, conceived in the wake of the mechanistic model, as the sum of the individual and not as an organic whole. For the Romantics is not true that history is neither a string of errors to look for or do not commit them again that humanity, the actor in history, is a mere sum of individuals. Exists the belief that the plaintiff's story is one and, in this respect, Hegel speak of the spirit world and say they saw him riding will see when Napoleon. The actor in the story is more complex than the sum of the individual, is the spirit of world history is thus governed not by individuals but by an entity above and on this basis will flourish provvidenzialistiche interpretations (eg, Manzoni The Betrothed). However, it remains unclear whether that actor in the story is transcendent or immanent: for Christians is transcendent, it's up that is beyond the world (and Manzoni is), many others will be immanent, or rule by the history of humanity ' procedure. From this view shows the superiority of the spirit of the world than to single individuals (men) and collective (states), although it remains true that States are worth more than the individual (in contrast to the mechanistic view). With regard to religion and politics, the Enlightenment believed that there was ever something good and right (the natural religion and the state fair) compared to the historical realities which were unsuccessful attempts: for the most part the Enlightenment were deists, and considered the historical religions as unsuccessful attempt to reproduce the one true religion, the rational one, which showed the existence of God solely by reason. Similarly, there was in their a rational model of opinion was right that must be applied equally in all reality. The Romantics, on the other hand, I consider that to count as just the only actor in history, which takes place always and only through individuals: Hegel, for example, reject the distinction between religion and applied ideal religion, convinced that It is religion which is in its practical application, there is one not ideal. Hegel always speaks of the spirit world but also the spirit of the people, which are the same thing: for the spirit of the world, in turn, is realized in a determined spirit of the people. At the time of Pericles greek spirit of the people was the incarnation of the spirit the world, like Napoleon, at the time, was the incarnation of the spirit world. All this shows that there can be a spirit of the ideal world, detached from reality. So there is always and only religion in the individual historical achievements, so it makes no sense to talk about any ideal Christianity to emphasize the distinction between the theory of Christianity and its practical application: Christianity is what it is and has been in practice in its application. The same is true for individuals: Napoleon at that time embodied the spirit of the world, it was all there, in Napoleon. If any people at any given time represents the spirit of the world, this means that Greece has done what she did to herself but also for the spirit of the whole world. That is why in the old romantic idea emerges that people have a mission: Mazzini believed he could recognize a mission in Italy, entrusted with a universal value. The tendency of Mazzini was democratic and that will be that of Fichte and Schelling, and Hegel to be more aggressive and would be based on the belief that the people who embodies the spirit of the world also has the task to crush other peoples. If the Illuminati had great sympathy with the past, the attitude of the Romantic oscillates between two different positions, with different political corollaries (which explains, among the other, because they could be both romantic and reactionary progressives). There were thinkers who tried to express nostalgia for the past: in an era in which there organicism, it is normal that we look with sympathy to those eras in which they were born communities, populations, species facts in the Middle Ages, who returns so in vogue after the devaluation of the Renaissance and Enlightenment. The Middle Ages Romantic enjoys the sympathy of many a little 'because it is the time when they are born peoples and nations, a little' because the company was seen as an organic whole and not as a place where self-interest were equilibria (as was the Enlightenment Society) and a little 'because even the most reactionary looked with sympathy and regret to medieval feudalism, now permanently ousted from the French Revolution. There were also romantic and sometimes had a progressive attitude towards the revolutionary past: an era in which it is increasingly felt the idea of \u200b\u200bnation, we look to the medieval past in which nations were born and there will be part of a progressive nation in key, often giving themselves to the revolution (the Risorgimento). A revolutionary dimension is also present on the psychological level: they can not be satisfied for many the natural desire to reach the infinite, in reality it feels displaced surrounding us rebels. In this perspective, we can still quote The last letters of Foscolo's Jacopo Ortis: there is the theme of exile political and existential at the same time. The protagonist, Jacopo Ortis, but aim at the absolute reality is relegated to rather low, so that opts for the uprising and suicide. It can also be progressive in another way, so connected to organicism: if we assume, as does Hegel, the existence of a spirit world, inevitably end up applying for an anthropomorphic model of history, or designed the historical phases carried by the spirit the world as the life of an individual, characterized by a birth, growth and death. Not only that: the history of the individual can also be seen in key purposeful (as did Aristotle) \u200b\u200band this will affect the education that we impart to children. In fact, key in the child is conceived in a teleological view of man, so that, properly, to have a value is only man made. But if history can be seen as the life of a person and if the life of a person is seen finalistically, then the story can be seen finalistically. And for this most Romantic does not deny that there is finality in its history: Hegel is convinced that there is an inherent and intrinsic ultimate goal of humanity generally, this embryonic since the dawn of history and intended to be, sooner or later realized. What counts, however, in this view, as in life finalistically understood is not the child but the man should be the future, on the realization of the purpose, and the past should have less value, as they believed the Illuminati. But the Romantics live in the belief that all stages of history are important: Hegel, not surprisingly, say that the real is the whole, underlining the truth that there is only the end and lies in history taken in its entirety . Of course, for Hegel and other Romantics like the Enlightenment, the historical situation now is better than the previous but, although lower, are not errors but are all necessary steps, providentially managed by the spirit of the world. That's because 'every negative is also always positive' (Hegel): even wars, revolutions, violence and other negative things that are positive and necessary providential manifestation of the spirit of the world, there are no errors in the story because everything falls the purpose. Precisely for this reason-age romantic historical novels are full, in which the loss of the protagonist are necessary and just. This Hegelian conception is in some ways progressive (because it reads the story as a process that tends towards an end), for other conservative (What has happened and is happening just because it is always necessary stage of humanity does not make sense to be revolutionaries) but has never reactionary (do not make sense to look back nostalgically to the past). Here's another difference emerges: the Enlightenment to the progress towards an end was not ruled by a divine actor and it was individuals and not as an organic whole humanity. Leading the way to Romanticism is the Sturm und Drang, a form of proto-romanticism extremist, often over the titanium: the individual stands alone against the reality. And it is in Sturm Und Drang that rises for the first time pantheism, identifying God with nature of the process leading to pantheism kicks off with Fichte: spiritualized nature, the transition to identification with God is just around the corner. In the Romantic flourish therefore mainly two attitudes, pantheism and fideism; remain outside the deism of the Enlightenment that smelled too. Pantheism finds in Goethe one of its greatest exponents and will be characterized by the idea that history is to hold a spirit immanent in the world. Fideism Jacobi and Hamann will hand in its ramparts and will claim the priority of faith over all in the belief that there is another tool to get in touch with the absolute. It is well to remember the lively controversy over pantheism who was born in the Romantic period: the documents are found in which the Enlightenment philosopher Lessing confessed that he converted to Spinozism. From this flows the debate, which marks, among other things, the reappearance of Spinoza on the philosophical scene, after a century of absence because of his alleged atheism. There will be those who will line up alongside Spinoza and those who criticize, but it is interesting, everyone will recognize the greatness and importance. Who will see him as a mere mechanistic criticize him, but who will see him as a great pantheistic (Goethe) will appreciate it as it was Giordano Bruno.
With the philosopher Herder and settled with HAMANN un'indisgiungibile connection between reason and language. Hamann, in Metacritica pluralism of Reason (1784), criticizes the alleged purity of reason and ends, such as Herder, to support the non-existence of pure reason. As the spirit of the world there is always and only incarnate, so there is no reason that language is embodied in individual events. It is true that there is a reason that pure reasoning, and then performs it is mechanically translated into Italian, French and English. Speaking in a language means, on the contrary, to think in a way. The reason is, that is, always fell in its content, just like religion. It 'good to mention two words typically romantic and Hegelian with different meanings than we are used to give us an abstract (from the Latin abstrahere) means 'pulled off', real (from the Latin connate) means 'grown together'. Abstract things will be designed separately from each other, but concrete things will be designed in relation to each other. Now, the reason there is never separate from the language and is therefore real, or is conceived in relation to language because it is already at work in it: 'without language man has no reason and no reason has no language'. The reason Kant was abstract, as conceived free from ties with the rest. In this perspective, the mechanism is abstract (The individual parts are prepared separately) and the organicism is concrete (not every piece is conceivable only in relation to all others and, above all, to the whole). Interestingly, next to a romantic location in the strict sense, there is also opposed to it, a position that criticizes formal classicism to Romanticism. To join this school of thought was Goethe, Sturm und Drang by abscission and Romanticism, as well as on the Italian side, Foscolo. However it is not entirely correct see a clear contrast between classicism and romanticism, as if they had some common features. Although the classicism is deeply sympathetic to the classical world, even the Romantics, though in a manner of their own, enjoy the world of classical antiquity.
The figure of Goethe is interesting because it marks the transition from disparate cultural movements, starting from the Sturm und Drang, through Romanticism to Neoclassicism and landing. Very interesting is his philosophy of nature, as it reveals the full membership organicists models then in vogue. Goethe says that all expressions of nature are variations on a single original prototype, a plant (Urplanz) from which all plants are derived. It is a typical romantic, since design is one of many attempts to eliminate all forms of dualism, the belief that all is attributable to a single principle: with Fichte and idealism has overcome the opposition subject / object, with the pantheism that nature / God and Goethe, pantheist believes, even try to bring each plant to a plant native. Goethe, among other things, he also wrote a booklet on color theory, which challenges the Newtonian interpretation according to which the colors are many and, if mixed, give white light: it opposes the theory that, contrary , the source is white light, seen not as the result of a composition, on the contrary, are the colors that result from the breakdown of it. It looks like a purely scientific controversy, but in fact plays a major role in philosophy: it is the mechanistic system (Newton) that actually have to count the individual (the colors), as opposed to the organismic (Goethe) that the partial existence has weakened, it is a mere manifestation of totality.
In the context of classical fits perfectly SCHILLER, which develops the concept of a beautiful soul, taking up an attitude towards morality grecizzante. We are accustomed to the idea that a soul can be good or bad, but Schiller claims that it can also be beautiful. That its position is attributable to an a clear challenge to the Kantian moral prevailing at the time, according to which it could not be morally assessed natural goodness. A patient who is spontaneous to be good, according to Kant, is not morally valuable, since it does not respond to the moral law but on instinct. Kantian view of moral judgments is instead subject who, contrary to their nature tend to be physical passions, is aimed at the rational part of himself and chooses based on what, perhaps in opposition to their nature. Schiller is not at all agree, and because of this, it introduces the concept of a beautiful soul, alluding to those souls who voluntarily adhere to a moral duty, without having to strain. E 'soul' beautiful 'in the sense that, in Kantian terminology, presents spontaneous harmony, free from constraints. From this stems the belief that Schiller is essential to create a beautiful soul kind of aesthetic education: ethics, that is, an aesthetic interpretation and the second is lived in this area is also a space for the game, already reassessed by Rousseau in 'Emilio. The educational value of the game, says Schiller, is that it manifests itself in the spontaneity characteristic of the beautiful soul, and break down the dualisms, in the best romantic tradition, since the natural spontaneity in the game is completely melted with the dimension of intellectual sensibility and intellect, just as in art, are in game one. Schiller opposed then, anticipating the Leopardi, poetry naive sentimental poetry: it will be naive poetry that appeals to nature, one that relies on the sentimental culture. The ancient poetry (Homer) was naive, while the modern is sentimental: it is typically romantic in every aspect of the idea that there is always a first stage spontaneous and immediate, that it at some point and go irrimidiabilmente necessarily lost. As efforts are made to recover, the recovery will not be immediate but will be mediated, that is, there will be more than the original situation but there will be a new one. Nevertheless, the recovery is not necessary because it could not future and is also good because, although some Romanticism celebrates the spontaneity and intuition, there are also convinced that the loss Romantic and mediation are beneficial, because it establishes a process of enrichment that leads to more than one had at the beginning. History itself, as we have seen, is finalist for the Romantic-style: all ages have their dignity, even though the full development of the value is in adulthood. Similarly, the recovery of the starting point takes on greater value than the starting point because it enriches itself. Not surprisingly, in music, the symphonies of the Romantic era often begin with a reason just mentioned, which is then lost some of the movements to be resurrected on the final enriched compared to the beginning: it is a reproduction of the Romantic-Hegelian philosophy, according to which there is a dimension that the original is lost (the classical world) and then be regained after a process of recovery that has even enriched. From the perspective of our modern, a broken vase and reglued is worse than before it broke, according to many Romantic (including Hegel), however, is better because it is enriched. Romantics will be optimistic that they will say that the classical world is perfect and can and should be emulated and we will Romantic pessimists who, while acknowledging the greatness of the classical world and the need to imitate him, will argue that it is impossible to do so. Finally, there will be those who say that the classical world has been lost and must be recovered and that recovery is even enriched. Moreover according to the Romantics is worth more than the virtue of innocence: the latter, in fact, is nothing if not naive primitive, not having yet had the opportunity to make mistakes and, not surprisingly, his agent Adam that, whenever they get the chance, go wrong. Virtue, however, allows you to recover the innocence, but was also affected from the negative: so this is a mediated recovery of the starting point starting ingenuity but not primordial, but from negative experiences that are transformed into positive (all negative is also positive). And the same goes for the recovery of the classical world.
In between classicism and romanticism, between poetry and philosophy are the personality of Holderlin. Typically it is the romantic conception of the poet as poet, born from the belief that the more the poet philosopher can fully grasp the essence of reality, pantheism and, above all, the tragic reality in the belief that the positive can emerge only from total loss: it is the most tragic moments, says Hölderlin, which may give rise to a hope of redemption. A romantic notion that states is more irony, concealment, autodiminuirsi as Socrates did in front of his interlocutors (Socratic irony): the irony is the typical attitude of man romantic, being aware of the nature of things which do not infinite lives and that he himself creates, realizes its limitations.
More poet philosopher, as Hölderlin, is also NOVALIS, pantheist and admirer of the Middle Ages. One of his major contributions on the romantic side of philosophy is certainly the so-called magical idealism, according to which the subject makes the subject but not so unconscious (as claimed by Fichte), but so conscious. Novalis, and this is hard to understand is that a poet philosopher, makes no scruple to assert that the world is a conscious production of the subject, in particular the poet understood then as a producer of worlds.
is also seen in the context of romantic Schleiermacher, who sees religion as a feeling of dependence on the infinite from the finite (man). Also defines the transcendental sense, to emphasize that it is constitutive of human nature, a feeling, a feeling that occurs in all men. He elaborates further the concept of hermeneutics, or the general theory of understanding: to translate the texts of Plato, in fact, developed an interpretive key (Who ruled for 150 years or so) that you had to interpret based solely on the writings of Plato (according to the motto of the Lutheran sola scriptura), although the greek philosopher had given more weight to the oral part. And it was the interpretation of Plato that the idea flashed Schleiermacher hermeneutics, however, already implemented by the Fathers of the Church in the interpretation of sacred texts: they kept it in mind that the Bible as a whole, is given by summation of the individual meanings of the books, and at the same time, you should read the individual books looking at everything, with the consequence that, if we examine the question in mechanistic terms, we are faced with an apparent vicious cycle. In fact, when a portion of the Bible, a general sense I already have and reading the individual books I do nothing but further study of the whole. Hermeneutics is applicable, as well as the interpretation of texts, including the interpretation of reality, because it allows me to better understand the individual parts all know in general terms and at the same time, allows me to investigate further the whole examining the individual parts. It is a process of strong romantic flavor, which comes in effect nell'organicismo because, after all, not counting the different parties, but the whole thing.
CDS-contrast discalzo@alice.it
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