Thursday, May 13, 2010

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Rousseau, Kant, Fichte and the Romantics. Notes.




                                                                   Jean-Jacques Rousseau


Romanticism stands first in strong disagreement with the reduction of man to self-love and reason calculator made by modernity and the Enlightenment came to fruition. The first reaction to this unwarranted reduction had occurred in England, with so-called "philosophers of emotion" (Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in the first place): these, in response to the reduction of man to reason and self-esteem, are arguing that the ' man is above all feeling and, in supporting this thesis, a crucial influence on the thought of Rousseau, which in many ways stands as the forerunner of Romanticism. At the heart of his reflection, there is a harsh criticism against the Enlightenment, guilty of having raised the critical thinking and calculating a unique goddess. But this rationalistic reflection, far from turning Earth into paradise - notes Rousseau - does that cause all the evils that would claim instead of healing: so it is not the remedy, but the cause of all evils, most notably the birth of self-love. With the reflection distinction and, consequently, conflicts (I / you and then my / your) hence, the tendency to compare and to oppose and what wells up the will to excel ego on you. Just this division generated by the critical reflection, involving self-esteem and, therefore, the will to excel over the other means that modern society is the reign of mutual hatred, mistrust, of concealment and dell'insincerità, conveniently hidden behind the veneer of good manners. So is this a society where happiness is outlawed and where everyone is afraid of everyone and no one is himself, because she finds it better to wear masks to dupe others. The fatal mistake in having the Enlightenment is thus taken to remedy the ills that instead it was the cause: self-love, fortified by reason calculator. But the man - noted Rousseau - calculator is not only reason and self-respect, it is also and above all a twofold sense: self-love and compassion. The self-love of which Rousseau speaks positively, however, should not be confused with self-love that he abhors, and that the Enlightenment led to the stars: if the self-love is on this side of each reflection, the love his is the legitimate child instead of reflection. This shows how the self-love, just upstream of the reason why the calculator will not engage in comparisons and, by virtue of this, does not conflict with others and can peacefully live with compassion for others derive from it source all major virtue, mercy, generosity, etc.. Thus, when Rousseau invites us to return to nature, he exhorts to return to this area located upstream of the reason the calculator and dominated by self-love and compassion. Just the man for even a moment apart from the deafening noise produced by reason and philosophical theories that proliferate by it, and immediately found the immediate certainty of its intimate and immediate feel (or self-love and compassion ): to talk about then is the voice of conscience, our deep feeling remained incorrupt despite the proliferation of rational calculation. What Rousseau is speaking here is the natural goodness of man: He claims a corrective action which war against reason that claims to be the only guide man. And the big project that is at the heart of the novel The New Heloise is solved precisely in an attempt, ambitious and sometimes incomplete, to tie together the feeling and reason, to the extent that you do not prevarichino each other.

addition to Rousseau, Kant is also one of the great sources that you drink from the Romantics: vibratamente also protest against utilitarianism el'eudemonismo Enlightenment, rejecting the concept of man as a mere self-respect and sensitivity. On hypothetical imperatives proposed by reason calculator can not be build a morality, since they do not seek to profit and happiness, but merely to explain the ways set out to achieve them. But, in addition to the suggestions of reason calculator, the man feels in himself the voice of pure practical reason, the categorical imperative that is intended only to orient human behavior to a universal and selfless act, as well as purely rational. The similarities with the speech of Rousseau are all too obvious: the Genevan philosopher performs in the field of practical reason the same function performed by Hume in the field of pure reason, Kant's awakening from dogmatic slumber in which it had sunk. In an effort to conform to the categorical imperative to act, winning the resistance of the sensitivity, man exercises his freedom, being free not to be determined by the senses, the instincts, the volitions and sensible inclinations. So what Kant Fichte emphasize the moral value of human effort as a manifestation of human freedom: the finite consciousness of man is essentially moral conscience, is striving towards an ideal of pure rationality, being unattainable, maintains constant tension in the human consciousness. This view is well summarized in the Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (1795) Schelling, who here still move in a broad sense fichteana perspective, so much happiness to be replaced with freedom of practical reason, which excludes all forms of hedonism: "the more we become free, the less we need for happiness, we need the fate [...]. To the extent that advances along the path of morality, the free man is seen lifted above the ideal of happiness sensitive "because the practical reason strives to reach the absolute identity with itself, that is trying to become pure and unlimited freedom. And this is bliss, profound sources of the unlimited freedom that enables rational land of the free poetry of life, rising above the prosaic life made of sensitive appetites. What Kant is thus the point of view of a finite consciousness that reflects on your knowledge, besides highlighting the limits of its potential. The philosopher is also the question because of our knowledge and, to that question, replied that this is the case under the pure reason that connects, for example, in certain phenomena causally situated in time and space. As children break toys to see the parties and so that we can understand how they function similarly Kant divides the parts of our knowledge (the sensitive material and our a priori structure), the synthesis of these parts to be precisely what we call knowledge . So we know the world because our knowledge is made reorganized the structure of sensitive data in advance. The perspective changes radically in the Critique of Practical Reason, since it is not possible to deduce the practical reason as it is done in the presence of which we find ourselves and that we must necessarily accept it as such. And so Kant does not answer questions like "why we hear the voice of the categorical imperative in us?" Merely note is like being a fact which does not allow any deductions. And then, in the Critique of Practical Reason, the German philosopher reflecting on the practice of practical reason, and explain the consequences if we act morally, then it follows that we are free, that God exists and that our soul is immortal. In other words, practical reason, which exists as a fact, requires freedom, the existence of God and immortality of the soul. But the fact remains that here too, like the Critique of Pure Reason, it remains a point of view over.

Even the thought of Fichte is a constant beacon for the Romantics: the center of his moral reflection is, as in Kant, the concept of Streben, that the "effort" that has called man to win the sensitivity. His philosophy is a "transcendental" in the double meaning of the term fixed by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason: "I call transcendental all knowledge that deals with non-objects, but the way we know them. " In this first meaning, the transcendental is the knowledge of the possibilities of knowledge, that critical reflection on the nature of knowledge. It is called "transcendental" because it transcends the mere ignorant to know him, but also because it is always a knowing that transcends human knowledge as such (that otherwise would not transcendental but transcendent) remains a point of view that is finished . Secondly, it is also the transcendental a priori structure of our knowledge, that is something that precedes knowledge, making it possible (the intuitions of space and sensitive time, the forms in advance of the twelve categories, I think). In a third possible meaning, is the transcendental component of our knowledge that transcends the individual subject empirically, since it is present in the same form in all men. The Doctrine of the science of Fichte moves directly from Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, and, although still in terms of finite consciousness, is able to deduce what Kant had failed to deduct the convenience of finite consciousness, his moral being. This is the essence of human consciousness: it follows then that man is above all moral and ethical rigor Kant becomes obsessive. The same is known, in the eyes of Fichte, function and expression of being human practical reason. But what makes the human consciousness is eminently morality? Of course - Fichte points out - not all men are capable of morality, and indeed the moral heroes are rare exceptions in a world of thieves and swindlers, but none the less the categorical imperative is indelible instance in humans, in every man . And the thought of Fichte proceeds as Kantian: if Kant had broken toy knowledge into its parts, Fichte seeks to break the moral conscience to be able to explain. In particular, he analyzes the practical consciousness, and shows the decomposed relations. The Ego practical consciousness is finished because it's effort to implement the categorical imperative, overcoming the resistance of the sensitivity, but what makes this possible? The practical consciousness is a synthesis of two opposites, a thesis and antithesis: that is the composition of an opposition. In this case, thesis and antithesis are the conditions that only the preconscious transcendental reflection captures, highlighting by abstraction: the transcendental reflection is then an unconscious back into the hall of consciousness. So the practical effort and sustained efforts to be the pure practical reason, without feeling we are here in the presence of an over? Or infinite? If it were over, would act only moved from hypothetical imperatives, so that in the presence of an object would say only nice to get it and how to act, he is made, quiet. But such an act is anything but moral, since it is entirely devoted to meet the needs of sensitive information. Moral action is instead a relentless and something has to end, the very reason and, therefore, is not induced from the outside is pretty radical and innate, that they can not ever quiet. The fine (pure rationality) is never reached, but the efforts of practical reason is never silent, but in fact time and again, reborn in us. This effort is the result of an infinite does not end with achieving a goal, but is reborn over and over again, even if the goal is never reached. Our effort is then that of an infinite, if impeded, he strives to return to its unboundedness, removing the limit, "the practicality of the finite spirit is his eternal destination, its infinity, is that by which the spirit is infinite. " So "the stress is infinite activities, limited, non-relinquishment of infinity [...]. The effort is precisely the synthesis of pure activity and limit, and that activity is limited but still contains the momentum of its infinity. " This is the result of the receipt of the transcendental reflection, composing the practical consciousness and discovering that it is always limited and never-ending tasks of a new limit. And activities are endless and the limit is precisely the thesis and the antithesis of that first mentioned, of which consciousness is synthesis. In terms fichteani, the thesis is "the ego posits itself," the antithesis of the "I opposed him a non-self." The resulting synthesis is the finite human minds to the world within which they act morally this point, expressed in terms fichteani, states that "the ego ego ego opposes a divisible divisible non-ego." The thesis is the activity infinite ego is the pure practical reason as an inexhaustible and unlimited activities identical to itself. This activity makes up our infinite consciousness because, at the limit, it tends to overcome it with effort, trying to recover its identity as a business that would be infinite if it were limited. But what is that limit? It is the feeling, or rather the feelings of our system: this is the antithesis against which hits the endless activities of pure practical reason, forced to the status of efforts to overcome the feelings that are opposed. As finite minds, we made the activity of the endless practical reason that, in the presence a limitation that hinders the effort becomes more and reiterated his recovery at the condition of infinity. The feelings are precisely the obstacle against which the mussel conscience: they come from the ego itself, which is congenital self-restraint, so always be there as I always stress that it merely becoming all the sensations. So the consciousness that we are the result of an effort to be themselves and overcome the obstacle that you have asked. This is the prehistory of the unconscious to consciousness the receipt of the transcendental reflection. The endless activity of the ego is always already the entire system of feelings against whom it strikes. In fact, there are always individual consciences over, over and over again made the effort to overcome the obstacle that they pose. Making cognitive activity, the ego becomes an obstacle to be overcome in the collision, changing the multiplicity of sensations in the representation of the world. The ego tends to infinity limit and, thereby, becomes the multiplicity of sensations, but, being infinite, it reacts to the obstacle and is not destroyed: the reaction to the obstacle is developed in two stages, one cognitive and one morale. In the first time, the mass is converted into a representation of the feelings the space / time in the world and this is because I became the theoretical consciousness (ie, productive imagination). Having made the shock surmountable, as theoretical, the ego becomes moral activity: theoretical reason passes in practical reason, since it is the only way that can really overcome surmountable quell'ostacolo made by theoretical reason. It is for this reason - namely the fact that the only practical reason can triumph over the limit - that Fichte never tires of reaffirming the superiority of the theoretical to practical reason: to be too theoretical reason to practical reason is functional, since only if we build a world through theoretical activity in it can then act morally. With this in mind, the feelings are reduced to self-affection of the ego: if it remained just a jumble of feelings, I could not be moral strength. Instead it reacts in two strokes, becoming first theoretical consciousness (and thus making the sensations representations space / time) and then, Build a world of representations, making practical consciousness. The feeling cut off the pure activity of the ego, which becomes an effort to recover his own situation and then making theorising practice activities. The ego reflects upon himself to discover everything that surrounds its own self-limitation: the world is not that the limit that the ego autopone, if the world is place unconsciously productive imagination (which transforms sensations into representations), then all knowledge results in varying degrees and aspects of the same productive imagination, which projects the sensations into objects that we believe at first outer ego. Fichte writes: "Since it does not belong to the ego that those do not put anything, you have to put the him that this limitation. Put this limitation is what we call feeling. " The ego always changes in sensation and makes it unconsciously, "through the imagination, the feeling goes into making life cognitive intuition space / time." What Fichte does not do is to deduce the over an infinite which preceded it: reflecting on the conditions of the finite, an infinite identifies you as one of its conditions. This activity has always existed as an infinite reaction to the limit, we are endless activities and autolimitatasi reagent such limitation as the first knowledge, then as a practical effort. The productive imagination encompasses transcendental knowledge was talking about Kant and the activity of the ego is both business and brake with this activity: "the conscience of the spirit is the activity of reason that you try." We and knowledge and practice, and our being the two is hindered by the effort of reason autoritrovarsi. When the ego there as I never pure, it is always an "I finished, which reacts to its limit and is therefore in constant search of himself, to exist is just the identity in search of itself, not the identity pure. Therefore there is no actual infinite and the first outside of the finite: the infinite exists only in the finite, as an effort to be infinite, so that the action of the finite and the infinite activity itself, an activity that always exists and only as an obstacle and in search of himself. The only actual infinite is the infinite stretch of the finite. The thesis and the antithesis are the real conditions of each of us that philosophical reflection, abstraction, projects in a purely philosophical prehistory: If the ego is moral effort, then he will be in the business and its infinite self-restraint. Let us draw the line on what has been said about Fichte When asked, "what we are made, we individual moral conscience and, thereby, free?", He replied that the establishment and infinite (ie, unlimited and unrestricted) activity of pure practical reason, that the infinite self-assertion of the ego as a moral activity and its simultaneous cramp becoming the multiplicity of sensations. Always the endless moral activity is limited so we are made of an infinite activity morale and feelings, which it is becoming limited. Just because we are such, we are what we are (finite moral consciences free) or we stress that we are ethical: more precisely the practical effort (theoretical / practical) of the ego to recover over the limit, namely the effort d ' what would be virtually (pure self-identity) if it has always and forever not restricted. We represent the world, transforming the dark feel in a world of objects from space / time: by doing so, the limit has become surmountable obstacle, in the world of objects in which to design and implement their own purposes. Already being theoretical consciousness, consciousness finite human ego is a practical effort to Auto retrieve, but that effort began as a theoretical consciousness. We feel the voice of the categorical imperative and fight against the senses always repeated in an attempt to assert the rationality of pure ego. This means that we are made of one, namely the infinite moral activity of the ego, which is the first principle of all reality. This work is endless but the principle that there is in itself a separate and earlier, but only in its variations, such as stress theoretical / practical. Fichte states that the three principles, the first two are abstractions made by reflection: the ego and the not-I can never be as such, there is always the third principle, that the multiplicity of finite minds and the multiplicity of finite objects that they represent a synthesis of thesis and antithesis. Fichte on the one hand relied on the consciences of finite human practice, on the other arrived at a conception in which the finite is made absolute: Kant had postulated freedom without deduct, while Fichte feels able to prove the contrary, any prospect realistic to speak of a consciousness detached from the real world can only have a deterministic outcome and denier of all freedom. So the most coherent exposition of materialism is that of the French sensationalism, in which man is understood as the laughing stock of his passion and sensitivity. Fichte demonstrates that the ego is the freedom to found the not-I, limiting freedom: the self is independent of its limitation, which has placed himself with a free act. Freedom is precisely then that the fact that it has put itself in the outside world: far from being passive, the reason is pure activity. Nothing against the antithesis of the thesis may merely, but never suppress it. Thus idealism explains the practical freedom, and the results were deterministic realism. The prospect fichteana closes with a absolutization of the finite: the finite consciousness is all reality, that is the absolute does not exist except as tending to infinity itself. The only way to be in search of identity is the identity of self. The absolute I, then, does not exist before and outside of the finite consciousness, but exists only in the finite as finite, or as an effort practical and theoretical. Fichte's speech does not concern an absolute ego I ever that creates the world ontologically preceding it: the absolute is infinite and only ideal is real, while the finite remains finite consciousness of an individual to be reflecting upon himself. To say that the only real finite is equivalent to saying that all is real only in the finite, as assets of the same over, the spirit is all finished, but it is not made absolute; then the absolute is an ideal towards which the finite tends relentlessly. Fichte says the non-deductibility of the multiplicity of real things: both the multiplicity of things is that of consciousness falls into the category of the incident and the accidental, which is why there is no answer to questions like "Why this world?", Or "Why these people?" or "because we represent our world?". The actual content of the individual consciousness remains in its contingency and pragmatism, unfathomable to transcendental reflection, which manages to deduce the features and structure general consciousness over, but not its content. Therefore, all questions about the empirical content (for example, "because this body?", "Because this world?" And so on) are impertinent questions, to which Fichte does not respond, as falling outside the transcendental reflection. In a famous fragment, Schlegel notes that Fichte, the French Revolution and Goethe's Wilhelm Meister are the boast of the time and, in another piece, mention the accusation of atheism brought to Fichte: Fichte would then attacked the religion ? If the essence of religion is interest in the supersensible, then the whole religion is its doctrine in the form of philosophy. " This suggests that the influence exerted on the young Fichte Romantics: the man of whom he speaks is constantly striving for the infinite, repudiates the purposes of which it is finite and sensitive pride of the Enlightenment.

Alexander Klein clipboard students in his class on Romanticism at the University of Turin 2004-2005



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